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ABSTRACT

This report examines the varying degrees of controversy and conflict experienced by two cities when they attempted to desegregate their public schools. Using these experiences as examples, the report shows how education boards can implement desegregation plans to avoid community controversy. The author stresses that issues basic to avoiding conflict are that (1) an administrator know the kinds of questions to ask, and that (2) he be aware of the way in which controversy is likely to develop given the uniqueness of his situation. (Author/JF)

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SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND COMMUNITY CONFLICT

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PREFACE

"School Desegregation and Community Conflict" examines the desegregation efforts of two school districts, Bay View and Zenith. Special attention is given to identifying general policy implications from the Bay View and Zenith desegregation experiences.

Dr. Holland, who is Chairman of Black Studies at the University of California, Riverside, also discusses the effects of the "Blue Ribbon Committee" and citizen participation in the desegregation process. His paper examines the impact of the school desegregation decision on school board elections and the relationship between school desegregation issues and increases in millage and bond proposals.

"School Desegregation and Community Conflict" can not tell school administrators how to avoid community conflict altogether. One would be unrealistic to expect that school desegregation will not be accompanied by some conflict and controversy. Holland's paper, however, suggests several ways in which school administrators can keep the conflict from seriously disrupting the community and its school system.

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INTRODUCTION

In "School Desegregation and Community Conflict," two cities are examined that, in attempting to desegregate their public schools, experienced varying degrees of controversy and conflict. The question guiding the research is, how can school administrators carry out desegregation plans without completely embroiling the community in intense controversy? In the final analysis their success is dependent on two things: (a) Whether they know what kinds of questions to ask, and (b) Whether they are aware of the way in which controversy is likely to develop given the uniqueness of their situation.

Limitations of time and space do not permit an indepth review of the two desegregation cases. A brief synopsis will have to suffice.

ZENITH

Zenith is a medium-sized town of about 177,000 with approximately 6.5% black population. It is located in middle America.

In 1963, the NAACP of Zenith became concerned with the fact that as more blacks migrated to the city, a dual educational system was developing. The NAACP asked the school board to adopt a policy statement in favor of "all children receiving an equal opportunity in the public school system."

The board responded by arguing that racial imbalance was caused by segregated housing patterns and, therefore, was outside its

domain. However, since racial balance was considered desirable, it would do all it could to alleviate the situation. The board also indicated that it was in favor of the neighborhood school concept and would not abandon it for purposes of achieving racial balance. Meanwhile, a citizens' committee of fifty persons was appointed to look into the matter.

In December of 1964, the Zenith Committee for Better Racial Understanding issued a report stating that the existence of de facto segregation represented a serious problem for the city. The report noted that 71% of the black high school population went to one of the three high schools in the city. Also, over 70% of the black junior high school students went to two of the five junior high schools.

The Zenith school system did not make it a practice of keeping statistics on the distribution of its student population by race. Hence, this was the first time that it had been conclusively demonstrated that segregation was alive and well in Zenith. The NAACP seized this opportunity to threaten a suit unless something was done.

In 1966, the board of education presented a cross-busing plan to the public. Immediately a white, anti-integrationist group formed to fight the move. They called themselves the "People's Action Committee on Education," (PACE). The school board held an open hearing to get citizen reaction to the plan.

Several interesting things happened at the citizens' meeting. First, the meeting was extremely physical. People were threatening to "punch each other in the mouth." Several board members received phone calls later by persons attempting to use "scare tactics" to get the plans changed. Secondly, the board was informed that there was a significant number of black citizens who were also in opposition to desegregation. Up until this time, the board had assumed

that the NAACP spoke for the black community. Finally, both the white and black anti-integration groups were able to form a measure of a coalition that enhanced the image of PACE.

Since school was to open in three weeks, PACE took the matter to court. The judge ruled that the plan could not go into effect until he could study its constitutionality. The judicial review had the effect of killing the plan for the coming year. But the school board was not to be denied. They redrew boundaries and made busing available for those who wanted to "take advantage of it." Finally, by 1969, Zenith schools were fairly well integrated. PACE ran candidates for election to the board, but was unsuccessful. Though controversy was intense, the board worked its will.

BAY VIEW

Bay View, similar to Zenith, has a population of around 177,000 of which 8.3% is black. In 1961, the school board of Bay View became concerned with the increasing concentration of minority groups in the central city. It was concerned with whether the education received by inner-city residents was a quality equal to the rest of the city. A committee of elementary school principals was appointed to study the matter. In the fall of 1963, the committee reported and the concerns that had been expressed by the board members were confirmed. The board responded by advocating an extensive compensatory educational plan for inter-city students.

In 1964, the NAACP of Bay View issued a report claiming that the facilities in the inner city were inferior to those in the city as a

whole. That same year, the board employed some specialists from the state university to anticipate the educational needs of Bay View for the next twenty-five years. Up until this point, the issue of de facto segregation had not been approached either by the board or the NAACP. Later that year, a citizens' committee appointed by the school board reported that the physical facilities in the inner city were comparable to those in the city as a whole.

The university specialists informed the school board that the city needed a radically new approach to education. Improvement of education required construction of new buildings and re-evaluation of the present means of assigning grades to certain schools. The specialists proposed the concept of the middle school, Grade 6 through 8, so that students could make an easier adjustment to high school. To implement these recommendations the board constructed a middle school in the inner city. In other words the board ignored consideration of racial balance in their new plan.

Word leaked out to the Bay View NAACP who immediately informed the State Civil Rights Commission (SCRC). The SCRC called the chairman of the Bay View School Board who confirmed the NAACP's claim. The battle over desegregation was on its way to becoming a major controversy. When the NAACP threatened suit, the school board moved to develop another plan that would implement the ideas of the university specialists, meet the goals of the NAACP and appease the white community. The director of child accounting for the city was told to forge out a plan that would do all three.

Even if desegregation were not attempted, the plan would have called for extensive busing. By attaching "racial balance" to it, they all but assured themselves of major problems. The final plan

that emerged called for one-way busing of blacks to predominately white schools that were either under construction or already existent. The plan involved four stages that were to be carried out over a four-year period. Stage 1 called for desegregation at the senior high school level.

True to form, the board held a public meeting on the plan and learned that substancial opposition existed both in the white and black communities. School was to start in two weeks and the plan went ahead on schedule. School had to be closed because of race riots in the halls, homes being firebombed and people fighting in the streets.

At the next election the three members of the board who were up for re-election were defeated in favor of opponents of desegregation. In addition two previous members on the board who had favored desegregation changed their positions and voted to elect one of the newly elected members to board chairman. The school board then had enough anti-integrationist members to reverse the plan. By this time, the SCRC had called on the assistance of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare who informed the school board of Bay View that they could not reverse the desegregation that had already taken place. Thus Bay View only partially implemented their plan and found themselves in a situation in which they could not go forward or backward. Furthermore, in a three-year period, the school board experienced a 100% turnover in membership.

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN ZENITH AND BAY VIEW

At this point, it might be helpful to point out some of the general similarities and differences we have found between our two cities. There are eight major points.

1. Busing - The use of busing as a means of alleviating de faco segregation represents a pattern that has emerged all over the country. Bay View and Zenith were not exceptions. In fact, neither school board considered any other proposal seriously. However, there were some important differences in the busing program.

Zenith was to employ a two-way busing system; Bay View thought only in terms of busing blacks to "white" schools. One might expect white parents in Zenith to be more upset than white parents in Bay View. That is, whites are more likely to oppose a two-way busing plan than one that calls for only the busing of black children. It is possible to argue that had Zenith used only a one-way busing solution, PACE would not have gotten as much support as it did. But, as I hope to demonstrate later, there were other factors in both cities which outweighed these considerations.

It is interesting to note that the anti-busing whites took care to contend that their position against busing was not racially motivated. They opposed busing "in priciple," not because it might bring about integrated schools. Yet in both cities extensive busing programs already existed that were not aimed at integrating the schools.

On the other hand, anti-busing blacks rested their stand on racial considerations. In Bay View, blacks wanted a measure of community control over the education of their children. Blacks in

Zenith simply asserted that no one particularly wanted to integrate.

2. Black division - The now obvious similarity that emerged was the fact that in both instances blacks were divided over the school desegregation issue. Two questions are of interest: (a) How can we account for the fact that in one city this division all but dominated the conflict, while in the other the issues raised by the anti-busing blacks did not seem to catch hold? and (b) How did this division change the lineup of disputants? We shall return to these questions later.

3. The school board's reluctance to admit that the issue belonged properly before them - Another pattern that has spread throughout the country has been the school board's refusal initially to address itself to the school desegregation issue. Hence, those who have sought integration have found it necessary not only to prove the existence of a segregated pattern of school attendance, but they have also had the burden of finding a governmental agency that identifies the problem as being within its domain.

The rationale most frequently used by the school board is that segregated school patterns result from segregated housing patterns which the school board can do nothing about. An additional factor that has gone unnoticed in the school desegregation literature is the fact that many school boards are legal entities that are separate from the city council. Hence, the board cannot be instructed by the council to consider the issue. The council can also avoid involvement in desegregation by simply claiming that school attendance patterns are outside its domain.

In both our cities the school boards refused the initial demands on the same grounds. But in both cases, the boards admitted

that the development of a duel educational system was not healthy for the educational system of the city. Having made this kind of commitment, they were later called upon to do "what was in their domain" to keep in tune with their pubically expressed sentiments.

4. The use of outside specialist and citizens' committees - School boards frequently employ specialists and citizens' committees for purposes of delineating the problems and proposing "professional" solutions. However, as Crain, (1968), noted, some school superintendents resent "outsiders" attempts to direct what are the proper functions for the school administrators. The administration of the school system is seen by the administrators as a technical job requiring specialized kinds of skills. One way to preserve the aura of the technical nature of the job is to appoint a "Blue Ribbon Committee."

Preserving the technical aura of school administration does not go far enough in explaining the widespread use of "Blue Ribbon Committee." In Zenith and Bay View, it does not explain things at all. In both cities, officials saw the committees as a means of building community consensus and legitimating the decision eventually made by the other boards. In neither case was the tactic effective. But there was another purpose to the committee that has not been given enough attention. The school board, by appointing a committee, is effectively able to delay making a decision that will divide the community and precipitate major controversy.

On the other hand, the appointment of a committee or the employment of specialists is tantamount to admitting that problems exist and, therefore, is a major victory for the integrationist forces. Furthermore, such action has the effect of placing the problem under

the authority of the school board. School board actions can then be monitored by groups vitally concerned with school desegregation.

5. Pro-integration decisions - In both Bay View and Zenith, the school boards made pro-integration decisions. As I have already indicated, this proposed change in the status quo certainly has the potential for bringing black division to the forefront. It is surprising that researchers have ignored this fact. The dynamics of black political division are really no different from other divisions that come about in community politics. Groups usually will not engage in mass protest to preserve the status quo until the existing order is perceived to be threatened. Since in practically every case on record, school boards have resisted the initial demands of the integration forces, those blacks who are against desegregation have had the board do their bargaining for them. Obviously then, the one factor which is likely to precipitate mobilization among this group has been missing in most of the cases studied to date.

6. The involvement of state and federal agencies - While in both of our cities there was a considerable involvement of outside agencies, the involvement was uneven and variously effective. The variability in effectiveness is, in part, attributed to the fact that the controversies took place at different points in time and, therefore, under somewhat different state and national policies. In Bay View the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) and the State Board of Education, through the initative of the State Civil Rights Commission (SCRC), prohibited the local forces from instituting what appeared to be the will of a majority of the citizens there. In Zenith the courts ruled, in essence, in favor of the segregationist forces.

7. The school board election as a weapon against the desegregation decision - In the final analysis the major recourse for those seeking to influence the decision-making process in America comes at election time. The opportunity to "vote the rascals" out of office played an important role in both cities. As shall be argued, that opportunity defined the parameters of the conflict and accounted for, in most respects, the level of success met with in both communities.

SCHOOL BOARD ELECTIONS

The Open and Closed Systems - In both cities the school board made pro-desegregation decisions that were unpopular with certain segments of the population. In both instances a redress of grievances was sought by approaching that body most directly responsible for the decisions, the school boards. Generally speaking school board elections do not arouse a great deal of interest in the community. In fact in both cities the most dominant issue for the decade preceding the conflicts was millage. In this sense then the school desegregation issues represented a disruption of the "normal" politics of the boards. In addition school desegregation provided another abnormality in that it precipitated serious community conflict.

Because of the relative assessibility of the Bay View Board, the issue had a significantly greater impact than it did in Zenith. In Bay View, for example, one-third of the board is up for re-election each year. Therefore even the most transitory of issues are given their "day in court" so to speak.

When the Bay View Board finally acquiesced to the demands of

the NAACP toward the end of the school year of 1968, immediately one-third of the board was up for re-election. The election took place at a time when emotions both in the black and white communities were extremely high. There was very little time lapse between the board's decision and the election. Since the election came on the heels of a controversial decision, the groups that formed to fight the decision had the advantage of having relatively low information cost. The people had an opportunity to react to the school desegregation decision while the issue was most visible to the public.

The situation in Zenith was different in some rather obvious ways. First, the decision came just after an election, which meant that two years would elapse before the people would be able to register an opinion at the polls. Even then only two members out of seven could be rejected.

The accessibility of the school board, of course, accounts for the different foci of the ad hoc groups. In Bay View the organizational focus of the white anti-integration group centered on the pending election. In Zenith the only real avenue available was the courts. Both anti-integration groups won their respective battles in the initial stages. But in the "closed" system, the court decision was not allowed to "stick". The court ruled that the busing plan would have to be delayed until more study of its constitutionality could be made. The court ruling in no way prohibited the school board from coming up with other plans that did not immediately involve busing, e.g., redrawing boundary lines, building new schools in areas that would draw on populations that would be racially mixed, etc. In other words, because of the <u>limited accessibility</u> to the school board by the public, the Zenith School Board could be flexible in

Figure 1

REVIEW OF THE CHARACTERISTICS

OF THE

BAY VIEW AND ZENITH SCHOOL BOARDS

Bay View	Zenith
1. Nine member board.	1. Seven member board.
2. Elections held every year.	2. Elections held every two years.
3. All terms for two years.	3. Terms for two, four and six years.
4. Two members of a nine-member board up for re-election every year.	4. Two members of a seven-member board are up for re-election every other year.
5. Vacancies filled by the board only until the next election.	5. Vacancies filled by the board for the duration of the term to be filled.
6. Millage is the most dominant issue in school elections.	6. Millage is the most dominant issue in school elections.

its approach to the problem. The members of the board who were responsible for the decision had time to work out alternatives.

In our two cities, it seems that the greater the opportunity for citizen participation, the greater the probability that the citizenry will opt for segregated patterns of school attendance. Comparing these two examples the forces for integration were those operating in the system which appeared having the best chance of success to depend least on the democratic process of voter selection. I am contending that the "open" system encourages citizen participation which in turn tends to place strain on the community. This strain may in turn make the community conducive to rancorous conflict.

One measure of strain is the formal leadership turnover rate. Given the rather "lack-luster" character of school board elections, one would expect as a matter of course, that there would be very little turnover on school boards. The turnover that is present under "normal" circumstances would result more from voluntary retirement from the board than defeat at the polls. Further, it might also be expected that the "open" system would have a higher turnover rate vis-à-vis a more "closed" system. When we observe these particular aspects of the two school boards some interesting patterns emerge. As we examine the turnover rates for the two boards, keep in mind that the school desegregation controversies became public issues in 1965-67 and from 1967-69 in Zenith and Bay View respectively.

I had assumed up to this point that one of the consequences of the "open" versus the "closed" system would be a relatively higher turnover rate in the former as a matter of course. If one examines the turnover on the two boards from 1957 to 1970 we see that Zenith (closed) has a higher rate generally than Bay View (open). (See

Table 1.) However, we should make note of the fact that the turnover on the Zenith board in 1959 can be accounted for by the fact that two board members whose terms had expired chose not run for re-election. Also, another board member died which left a total of three positions that were to be filled, but whose existence had nothing to do with the presence of any kind of community conflict. Under "normal" circumstances the turnover rates are not affected by the mobilization of the system. When we factor out the 42% turnover in Zenith in 1959, we see that in the "open" system the turnover during the desegregation controversy was greater than any of the turnover in the closed system over the entire thirteen-year time span.

We can note that previous to the desegregation conflict, both boards showed remarkable stability in turnover. Interestingly the election in Zenith that is closest to the controversy resulted in zero turnover.

Electoral Competitiveness - Another measure of strain might be the competitiveness of elections. Competitiveness is defined as the percentage of votes received by the winners versus the number received by the losers. The smaller the percentage of votes cast for the winner the more competitive is the election. One would expect elections to become relatively more competitive when there are controversial issues to be decided. Hence we could hypothesize that the elections closest to the school desegregation decision in both cities would be relatively competitive. Further we can also suggest that the more "open" the system, the more likely it is that controversial elections will be competitive.

Because of the rules governing the elections in Bay View as

Table 1

TURNOVER RATES FOR THE ZENITH AND BAY VIEW SCHOOL BOARDS

1957-1970



compared with those in Zenith, I had to rearrange the manner in which electoral competitiveness was to be measured. In Bay View, it is possible for the candidates to win a seat on the board by capturing a majority of the votes in the primary. This meant that sometimes there was no general election. Persons running for election in Zenith, on the other hand, must compete in the general election. These different electoral patterns necessitated using somewhat different methods in evaluating the competitiveness of elections within each city.

Upon examination of the school board elections in Bay View from 1960-70 we see that in seven out of ten of these at least two of the three positions available were filled in the primary election. In fact it could be argued that the school board elections representing the norm for the decade were so uncompetitive that for most of the positions a general election was not necessary.

Viewing the data a little differently demonstrates the emergence of another pattern. The probability that candidates will win elections in the primary appears to be a function of the number of people running for office. Stated differently, the greater the number of people seeking office, the less likely it is that there will be a victor in the primary.

We can see that any time there were twelve or more persons in the election, no one was elected in the primary. When there were from ten to eleven, one person was elected. Anywhere from six to nine meant that two people would emerge victorious in the primary. And finally, any time five or less were running, all three would be elected in the primary. The interesting thing to note is that this

pattern held for the elections in which school desegregation was an issue. The 1968 election was controversial, but only seven persons sought office. True to form two persons were elected in the primary. Hence we can conclude that it is not simply the controversy itself which produces competitive elections, but rather the number of persons seeking office. If a given controversy encourages an "abnormal" number of persons to seek office, then the election is likely to be competitive.

We can look at the competitiveness of the school board elections in Zenith in a more traditional manner. Competition in Zenith can be defined as the percentage of votes received by the victors. The smaller the percentage, the more competitive is the election. But as with Bay View the degree of competitiveness is also a function for the number of people seeking office. The point is proven out by examining the ratio of the number of positions available to the number of people seeking office. The only deviation from this occurred in 1965. This can be explained by the fact that one candidate withdrew from the contest after the ballot had already been printed. Also there were two perosns who received a single vote on a write-in.

Generally the school board elections in both cities can be characterized as non-competitive affairs. This characterization held true for Zenith throughout the decade of the sixties. In Bay View, the political system was more accessible and became more competitive during the controversy as a function, not directly of the conflict itself, but rather of the number of people who sought election. The "normal" involvement of the electorate in both cities in school board elections is relatively low. Turnover for both proved to be low and stable. The relative inaccessibility of the Zenith system

vis-à-vis that in Bay View only becomes apparent as a measure of accessibility is sought. The latter's conduciveness to rancorous conflict is what concerns us for the duration of the essay.

FACTORS AFFECTING DESEGREGATION PLANNING

As I indicated earlier, one of the most important considerations is the existence of black disunity and its effect on the development of the conflict. It is obvious that in both cities the basis for black division over the issue existed. In only one of our cities, however, did this division sustain itself over a significant period.

Part of the reason why the issue was kept alive in Bay View can be traced to the involvement of HEW and the SCRC. Both of these agencies insisted that the integration already implemented by the master plan not be reversed. The factors taken into consideration in the development of the plan assured the school board of continuous conflict, especially in light of the fact that the board could go neither forward nor backward.

As mentioned, the director of Child Accounting was charged with the responsibility of coming up with a plan that would be acceptable to both blacks and whites. As he himself acknowledged, "This all but eliminated the possibility of two-way busing." Obviously the school board, in giving this directive, felt vulnerable to pressures emanating from the community. The director of Child Accounting made two assumptions in drawing up the plan that proved later to be false. He thought that those blacks agitating for integration represented the entire black population of the city. Secondly, he assumed that the primary objection of whites would be the busing of their children.

It must be admitted that by being sensitive to feelings of the white population, the board removed the possibility of being taken to court by the white segregationists. Surely they would not be willing to claim in court that their constitutions rights were being violated by having blacks admitted to "their" schools. Their only real recourse was to change the composition of that body which made the decision to integrate the schools.

It might properly be asked at this point why the segregationist blacks did not choose to take the issue to court. They were in a position to make the same claim that whites made in Zenith. I do not have a definite answer to this question. Perhaps a partial answer would be that the conflict did not really start with these people over the busing issue. The initial demands of the ad hoc black community organization dealt with the refusal on the part of the school board to reconsider its previous decision to build an elementary school in an all-black area. Busing did become an issue rather quickly, however. Perhaps another partial explanation might be that the NAACP, the organization in the community which had the resources, both technical and financial, to sponsor such action, was the force behind the integration plan.

One additional factor in considering the non-involvement of the courts in Bay View may be the proximity of the decision to integrate to the start of the school year. The decision came two weeks before the first day of classes. There simply was not time to do much before the plan went into effect.

In contract the Zenith school board put forth a more equitable plan that involved two-way busing. They did not have to fear the immediate reaction of the white community. There was no pending

election. In fact it would be five years before a majority of the board would be up for re-election. The architects of the Zenith plan were simply and directly charged with the responsibility of eliminating segregation in the schools. There was no directive to be sensitive to any demand other than that one.

Once the segregationists had a majority of the Bay View board, they were anxious to reverse the desegregation decision. If this happened, the NAACP had already threatened to take the matter to court. Given that outside agencies prevented the board from reinstituting the previous status quo, and given that the first year of the plan was only to be a partial implementation of desegregation, not any of the groups involved, the NAACP, the white segregationists, or the black segregationists was satisfied. The plan continued to rest in limbo and remained highly visible. The next step was to take a "wait and see" stand on how the integration already effected would work out. The fact that it did not work out particularly well helped to keep the issue out front.

What concerns us immediately is the question of black division and its effects on the course of the controversy. The pattern which materialized in both cities was the beginning of a black-white coalition of segregationists. In the public meetings held before school boards these two groups were supportive of one another. In Zenith the white group that filed a suit included the parents of two black children who were also against the plan. In Bay View the black members of the board, after having sponsored the school desegregation plan, joined the ranks of the anti-integration people and pushed to elect one of them as board chairman.

In both cases black division caused some strain within the

black community. The longer school desegregation remained an issue, the more apparent the strain became. I shall attempt to specify several ways in which the strain manifested itself in each situation.

1. The first opportunity for the strain to become visible came with the public hearings sponsored by the school boards. Both anti-integrationist black groups made the claim that those black leaders demanding integration did not really represent the black community. This came as a surprise to the NAACP and the school boards alike. Previous to this both boards had assumed relative black unity on the question of integration.

2. The black leadership structure in Zenith was constituted in such a way that it was unlikely that a purge would take place. There were no blacks on the school board. The body which most closely incorporated a black leadership set was the Human Relations Council. Two of the blacks on the council were also NAACP leaders and were directly responsible for the school desegregation plan. Given that the plan never really got out of the courts and that the board instituted desegregation in other ways, the black community never really mobilized against the leaders on the council. Hence, the only real confrontation which took place among blacks was at the public hearing held by the school board.

3. In Bay View, there were more opportunities for confrontations between opposing black groups. First of all there was a black person on the school board. In fact Bill Johnson engineered the desegregation proposal and was the main force behind getting the board to consider the whole question. He became a target for both sides. As the director of the local Urban League he was most closely allied with the NAACP. When the conflict continued to escalate, it became

clear to Mr. Johnson that his integrationist stance was intolerable to major segments of the people he saw himself as representing. Therefore practically any stand he chose to make would be unacceptable to someone. After the election in 1968 he joined with the three new white segregationist members of the board to elect one of them chairman. As one might suppose this was totally unacceptable to the NAACP who threatened to challenge Johnson in the next election. Caught between, as it were, two irrevocably opposed forces, Johnson resigned his post.

Johnson's replacement was also black and found herself in a no less vulnerable position. She called for the assistance of the SCRC. However the SCRC indicated that, given the division in the black community, it had no proposal that would satisfy the disputants. Any time a person is appointed to fill an unexpired vacancy on the Bay View board, that individual must run for election the next time a school board election is held regardless of whether or not the vacancy filled is scheduled to expire at that time. Seeing no immediate solutions on the horizon, she declined to run for reelection.

4. Another indication of strain in Bay View appeared with the dissolution of the Human Relations Council. After one high school had been closed as a result of racial violence and threats had been made on the lives of various persons, it became apparent that the Human Relations Council was not able to do its job. It was disbanded and a new council was formed. In all there were six blacks who were either removed from or removed themselves from office.

In examining the formal leadership structure we find that the

six leaving the Human Relations Council represented exactly 60% of the black leaders in the city. I am not trying to suggest that there is a one-to-one relationship between the formal and informal leadership structures. Undoubtedly there are certain influentials in the community who do not occupy formal leadership positions. On the other hand there are some formal leaders who may not exert "real" influence. But in the case of Bay View there is every reason to believe that most of the blacks in office were considered to be community leaders. Also we should consider the fact that when the conflict escalated, it was these leaders who were forced to give up their positions in favor of others who might be more in tune with current demands.

In a certain sense, it is somewhat misleading to compare the strain on the black community of Bay View with that in Zenith. The conflict ended "prematurely" in the latter and, therefore, the issue was taken away. It is important to observe, however, that the school board in Zenith did still pursue an integrationist course of action even after losing the battle in the courts.

5. A final indication of strain in Bay View surfaces when we examine the role played by black ministers, especially as that role involved the proposed school boycott. Two weeks preceding the opening of school the black ministers met and decided to oppose the boycott. Each was instructed to return to his pulpit and encourage parents to send their children to school. Boycott sponsors denounced the ministers as "Uncle Toms" who had a vested interest in seeing to it that the boycott failed.

There was no such conflict in Zenith. In fact the ministers, who seemed to wield a significant amount of influence, remained

silent during the entire affair.

From the analysis of the situation in our two communities one might conclude that the conflict as it existed in Zenith was not particularly intense. This is only true in relationship to Bay View. When we examine the incidence of rancorous conflict, it is clear that emotions were running high in both cities. I should note here that I am referring to incidents that were reported in the newspapers. Certainly there could have been more incidents than those in the news.

In Zenith two incidents were reported. As expected both of these took place during the height of the controversy. The first of these occured at a time when the system was the most accessible, i.e., during the public hearing held by the school board. The anti-integrationist whites provided the action when one of the members rushed to the podium and physically threatened one of the school board members. The other incident involved phone calls to various black and white supporters of the desegregation plan calling them "communists" and threatening to "see to it that they did not have their way."

At the time of the public hearing in Bay View the same kind of threat existed. In this sense both communities experienced similar kinds of rancor at similar points in the controversies. As the Bay View conflict continued other more serious things happened. First, one of the homes of a black supporter of the plan was firebombed. Secondly, black students were physically beaten by other black students because of differing views on the matter. One of the high schools had to be closed on two separate occasions because of fighting in the halls between blacks and whites. The

ministers all received threatening phone calls. Finally, the anti-integregationist blacks marched on the school board headquarters twice.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

This study is an attempt to deal systematically with differences between individual cases of school desegregation. For example, there is a qualitative difference between the situation in St. Louis, where the school board finally acquiesced to the demand to allow the few black students who were being bused to be actually in classrooms with white students, and Pasadena, where the integrationist advocates made more forceful demands. The work "integration" was employed to cover both situations when actually it meant different things in different communities. Such a qualitative difference existed between our two case studies as well.

Given the size of the high school population in Zenith, it would have been possible to send all of the black students to a single school and not threaten the white majority of that school. When we consider the fact that the black population was to be spread throughout three high schools, blacks would be even less conspicuous. In each school blacks would constitute less than 2% of that school's population. In other words white parents had no reason to "fear" a large influx of black students.

Furthermore, the Zenith plan in its first year affected less than 2% of the total school population. Herein lies a key to a fuller understanding of the conflict. As we shall see not only was the Bay View system "conducive," but also the respective plans in the two cities had the effect of minimizing the conflict on the one hand, and maximizing it on the other.

The white parents in Zenith most directly responsible for the organization of PACE were those whose children were to be bused. They were vocal, loud and had some measure of city-wide support. But in the final analysis their numbers were not sufficient. Even though they gained a victory in the courts, they knew full well that the school board would find another way to work its will. PACE ran two candidates for the election of 1967. By this time the board had instituted a measure of desegregation in ways that did not involve busing and had plans on the drawing board for a new high school that would do the same thing. By the time the election came around the issue was a "non-issue," and PACE's city-wide support had dissipated under the weight of other more visible issues.

What did integration mean in Zenith? At most it meant the disruption of a relatively small percentage of the total school population. At the very least it meant building many needed new schools that would draw in a racially diversified student population. With relatively little effort is was possible to bring about the integration of the Zenith public schools.

Obviously such was not the case in Bay View. Not only was the system "open" to the pressures of various segments of the population, but also the plan to be implemented affected a large percentage of the school population. The integration of the junior and senior high school levels necessitated the reassignment of the grades that schools would service. In some schools a grade was added. In others grades were deleted. Even though most of the students at the junior high level would not have a racial mixture too different from their previous experience, the plan necessitated

their changing schools.

Furthermore, in order to bring about meaningful integration, two of the high schools that previously had no black students would "overnight" have 10% of their student body composed of "outsiders." This coupled with the fact that only black students were being bused and that black seniors would not be allowed to graduate from "their" school served to make the plan objectionable to almost everyone affected. Integration in Bay View meant the involvement of the total city. Many black students for the first time were a minority in a school. White students for the first time were in the same school with more black people than they probably knew existed in the city. Clearly integration meant different things in the two communities.

Another factor which added to the incidence of rancor is related to the fact that in Bay View integration of the schools actually took place. The black-white confrontations would not have taken place had not the "physical" opportunity been so readily available.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

What does this investigation mean to the administrator whose job it is to implement school desegregation? I shall not suggest to anyone that there are "fool-proof" ways of insuring that such an issue will not tear the community apart. Indeed, there are none. But clearly, school boards have continued to make the same kinds of mistakes over and over again. One should at least be aware of what these mistakes have been and what steps should be taken to avoid following along the same footpath.

1. School desegregation and bond proposals. Desegregation should never be contingent on bond issues. This is not simply to avoid defeat of the proposals, but rather it is to avoid providing a "natural" issue which will allow people to hide behind, e.g., the guise of being against raising additional funds. It is becoming increasingly unpopular in America to oppose people simply on racial grounds. Thus the administrator should make every effort to present one and only one issue to the public.

2. School desegregation and frequency of elections. In one of our cities almost any issue would be able to get translated into the political system because there was an election each year for one-third of the seats on the school board. Not only did this mean that the segregationists would be able to muster a majority, but it also meant that the school board became the central target of all the groups involved in the conflict. Hence in the early stages of the controversy the school board members found themselves uncomfortably on center stage all the time. The fact that race riots broke out in one school after desegregation, served to embarrass those board members who supported the plan in opposition to others who "said all along that it would not work."

3. Participation and school desegregation. One of the motivations behind employing citizens' committees is the attempt to build a community consensus. A board which seeks such unity in this manner will usually find the committee ineffective. This is not to suggest that such committees have no proper functions. They can serve as an information gathering agency. Beyond this, citzens' committees will be able to accomplish little.

Some school boards have also decided that public hearings on desegregation plans are both necessary and desirable. Whether or not they are necessary will have to be determined by each individual school board. I think we can safely say that they are not necessarily desirable. Community hearings tend to be fairly rancorous.

Furthermore open hearings also provide the enemies of such plans the opportunity and impetus for organizing and fighting the school board. In addition these meetings also will inform the segregationists in the white community that they have a measure of support among the black population. Allowing those concerned about school desegregation an opportunity to "let off steam" does not have the same effect it has in physics. That is, the tension in the community will not necessarily be reduced. In fact, as I have suggested, just the opposite may be the case.

4. Integration and grade level. Clearly it is easier to integrate grade schools than it is to integrate the higher levels. This does not mean that the parents will be any more cooperative. In fact it may be that the parents will be more concerned. But once the schools are actually integrated there is less likelihood that race riots will close the schools down.

5. School desegregation and outside agencies. If at all possible the school board should involve outside agencies at the state or national level. If the board can show that the policy it is advancing is consistent with state or national law, the strength of the opposing groups will be diminished. That is, the board must demonstrate that regardless of who is elected to the board, the same policy will prevail.

6. School desegregation and the number of people affected. It is obvious that a gradual school desegregation will involve fewer hostile people than one that seeks to integrate the entire district in one single stroke.

The above comments are intended to assist school officials with desegregation efforts. As I indicated earlier there are no clear-cut rules for bringing about a desirable outcome. However there are some aspects of the matter that should be known. The school administrator who is sensitive to the dynamics of community conflict and who approaches the issue of school desegregation in a flexible way is likely to be fairly successful in keeping the resulting conflict within tolerable limits.

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